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CONTENTSAbstract
This paper provides new evidence on the eﬀects of government
spending shocks and the ﬁscal transmission mechanism in the euro
area for the period 1980-2008. Our contribution is two-fold. First,
we investigate changes in the macroeconomic impact of government
spending shocks using time-varying structural VAR techniques. The
results show that the short-run eﬀectiveness of government spending
in stabilizing real GDP and private consumption has increased until
the end-1980s but it has decreased thereafter. Moreover, government
spending multipliers at longer horizons have declined substantially
over the sample period. We also observe a weaker response of real
wages and a stronger response of the nominal interest rate to spending
shocks. Second, we provide econometric evidence on the driving forces
behind the observed time variation of spending multipliers. We ﬁnd
that a higher ratio of credit to households over GDP, a smaller share
of government investment and a larger share of public wages over total
government spending have led to decreasing contemporaneous multi-
pliers. At the same time, our results indicate that higher government
debt-to-GDP ratios have negatively aﬀected long-term multipliers.
Keywords: Government spending shocks; Fiscal transmission mechanism; Struc-
tural change; Structural vector autoregressions; Time-varying parameter models
JEL classiﬁcation: C32; E62; H30; H50
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During the recent economic crisis ﬁscal policy has been rediscovered as a
tool for short-run economic stabilization. Many governments have adopted
sizeable ﬁscal stimulus packages, mostly based on increases in government ex-
penditure, to counteract the severe fall in aggregate demand. However, there
is still disagreement on whether ﬁscal policies, and in particular government
spending, have lost (or gained) power in stimulating economic activity over
time, and if so to what extent and why. This uncertainty is particularly acute
for the euro area, for which there are very few empirical studies, not last due
to the lack of quarterly ﬁscal data.
Against this background, this paper builds on a newly available quarterly
ﬁscal database for the euro area compiled by Paredes, Pedregal, and P´ erez
(2009) for the period 1980Q1–2008Q4 to oﬀer the following two contributions.
First, we estimate changes in government spending multipliers for the
euro area, using the tools of Bayesian time-varying parameters VAR analy-
sis, in the tradition of Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005) and Primiceri (2005).
This approach allows to tackle issues related to subsample instability and
structural changes which are particularly relevant for the euro area, for ex-
ample in view of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the run-up
to the Economic and Monetary Union, and the single monetary policy since
1999, in a thorough way. The analysis also allows to derive estimates of gov-
ernment spending multipliers for each quarter in the sample, rather than an
“average” estimate over the whole sample. This is clearly helpful for a better
understanding of the way ﬁscal policy feeds through into economic activity,
especially in the last quarters or years.
Second, we provide econometric evidence on the driving forces behind
time variation in government spending multipliers and, in a broader sense, the
ﬁscal transmission mechanism. In particular, we relate spending multipliers
to a set of macroeconomic indicators and to the composition of spending
using regression analysis.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the eﬀectiveness of spending shocks in stimu-
lating economic activity has substantially decreased over time, but in a non-
monotonic way. In fact, short-run spending multipliers increased until the
late 1980s when they reached values above unity, but they started to decline
afterwards to values close to 0.5 in the current decade. At the same time,
long-term multipliers show a substantial and continuous decline since the
1980s. These results suggest that other components of aggregate demand are
increasingly being crowded out by spending based ﬁscal expansions. In par-
ticular, the response of private consumption to government spending shocks
has become substantially weaker over time. We also document a weaker re-
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stronger reaction to spending shocks.
With respect to the factors behind the observed time evolution of govern-
ment spending multipliers, our evidence indicates that better access of house-
holds to credit reduces the short-term eﬀectiveness of expenditure based ﬁs-
cal stimuli. This suggests that the presence of credit constraints and limited
asset market participation limits Ricardian behaviour since a larger share
of agents cannot borrow or save immediately against a higher future tax
burden. In addition, we ﬁnd that the composition of government spending
matters. In particular, a lower share of government investment and a larger
wage component in total spending may have contributed to the documented
decline in short-term multipliers. These ﬁndings support the argument that
government investment may have an additional positive aggregate supply ef-
fect in addition to the aggregate demand eﬀect through government goods
purchases. Finally, our results indicate that rising government debt is the
main reason for declining spending multipliers at longer horizons, and thus
increasingly negative long-run consequences of ﬁscal expansions. In the spirit
of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000),
we interpret this ﬁnding as an indication that further accumulating debt af-
ter a spending shock leads to rising concerns on the sustainability of public
ﬁnances. In this context, agents may expect larger ﬁscal consolidation in the
future which, in turn, depresses private demand and output.
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Fiscal policy has been rediscovered as a tool for short-run economic stabi-
lization. Governments around the world have enacted unprecedented ﬁscal
stimulus packages to counter the severe economic downturn triggered by the
ﬁnancial crisis. For instance, the ﬁscal stimulus adopted within the Euro-
pean Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) is expected to reach about 1% of the
EU’s GDP in 2009 and 0.9% in 2010, and it is largely expenditure based
(see European Commission, 2009). However, there is a high degree of un-
certainty concerning the eﬀectiveness of government expenditure policies in
stabilizing economic activity. The theoretical and empirical literature on the
eﬀects of government spending shocks reﬂects this uncertainty and it is rather
inconclusive so far, especially as regards the euro area.1
Against this background, this paper oﬀers two contributions. First, we
uncover changes in the eﬀects of government spending shocks in the euro area
over the period 1980–2008 using the tools of Bayesian time-varying param-
eters VAR (TVP-VAR) analysis.2 Second, we provide econometric evidence
on the driving forces of the observed time variation of government spending
multipliers and, in a broader sense, the ﬁscal transmission mechanism. In
particular, using regression analysis we relate spending multipliers to a set of
macroeconomic indicators and to the composition of spending. The underly-
ing idea is that time variation–caused by structural change–may reveal new
facts about the macro impact of government spending shocks. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper which investigates time variation in the
eﬀects of government spending shocks through an application of state-of-the-
art Bayesian techniques and which, in addition, provides empirical evidence
on the driving factors behind the changing patterns of spending multipliers
by means of a systematic exploitation of state dependency.
We believe that the TVP-VAR methodology outperforms simpler meth-
ods including sub-sample or rolling-windows estimation for several reasons.
Most importantly, structural changes might not be easily identiﬁed a priori,
or they may take the form of processes that last several years. In addition,
ﬁscal multipliers might change in a non-monotonic way. Finally, dating a
break and determining the size of rolling windows would have to be arbi-
trary to some extent. Indeed, one can think of numerous structural changes
1The related literature is discussed in detail in Section 2.
2These tools have been applied previously to investigate changes in the eﬀects of mon-
etary policy in the U.S. and the relation to the “Great Moderation” (see e.g. Cogley and
Sargent, 2001, 2005; Primiceri, 2005; Benati and Mumtaz, 2007; Canova and Gambetti,
2009; Gal´ ı and Gambetti, 2009) and the implications of structural change for macroeco-
nomic forecasts (see D’Agostino, Gambetti, and Giannone, 2009).
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samples for one of them (e.g. monetary policy regime changes) is unlikely to
ﬁt another (e.g. trade integration).
We focus on the euro area since sub-sample instability should be an im-
minent fact given signiﬁcant structural changes experienced since the 1980s.
Examples include the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the run-up
to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of the single
currency and the single monetary policy since 1999. Such events should en-
hance the scope for time variation and help the identiﬁcation of the driving
forces of the ﬁscal transmission mechanism.
Based on a newly available quarterly ﬁscal data set developed by Paredes,
Pedregal, and P´ erez (2009), ﬁxed parameters VAR estimations over the full
1980–2008 sample suggest that, on average, government spending shocks have
had an expansionary short-run impact and moderately contractionary long-
term eﬀects on output and the domestic components of private demand in
the euro area. However, our time-varying approach allows to uncover impor-
tant changes in the macroeconomic impact of government spending shocks.
In particular, our results show that short-run government spending multipli-
ers on real GDP and private consumption have increased until the end-1980s
but they have decreased thereafter. Moreover, the expansionary eﬀects of
government spending have become more short-lived over time. Long-term
multipliers have decreased substantially over the sample period. The eﬀec-
tiveness of spending based ﬁscal expansions in stimulating economic activity
thus appears to be particularly low in the current decade. In addition, we
show that smaller spending multipliers coincide with a weaker response of
real wages and a stronger response of the short-term nominal interest rate.
With respect to the driving forces of the ﬁscal transmission mechanism,
our evidence points towards households’ access to credit as the most impor-
tant determinant of the size of contemporaneous spending multipliers. In
particular, we ﬁnd that an increase in the ratio of credit provided to house-
holds over GDP leads to a decline in contemporaneous multipliers. This
result provides support for recent arguments suggesting that access to credit
and non-Ricardian behavior by households matter for the size of ﬁscal mul-
tipliers. Regarding the composition of government spending, we ﬁnd that a
smaller share of investment expenditures and a larger wage component have
led to declining short-run multipliers. Our results therefore support the view
that government investment may have an additional positive aggregate sup-
ply eﬀect in addition to the aggregate demand eﬀect of government goods
purchases. The fact that wage payments are associated with lower multi-
pliers provide support for a recent arguments stating that government wage
expenditures may have adverse eﬀects in an imperfect labor market through
8
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we ﬁnd that the level of government debt is the main determinant of the
long-term eﬀects of government spending, i.e. an increase in the ratio of gov-
ernment debt over GDP leads to a decline in spending multipliers after ﬁve
years. This result suggests that, given higher initial government ﬁnancing
needs, sustained deﬁcits after a spending shock may lead to rising concerns
on the sustainability of public ﬁnances and expectations on a larger future
consolidation, which depresses private demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes our econometric model, the estima-
tion method, the data and the structural identiﬁcation approach. Section 4
presents the estimation results. It ﬁrst discusses results from a time invariant
VAR and then the evidence from the TVP-VAR. Section 5 investigates the
driving forces of the ﬁscal transmission mechanism. It ﬁrst provides an ac-
count of existing views on the transmission mechanism and then identiﬁes the
determinants underlying the observed time variation in spending multipliers
using simple regression analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
On the theoretical side no consensus has been achieved so far concerning the
impact of government spending shocks on the main macroeconomic variables.
General equilibrium models currently used to evaluate the eﬀects of govern-
ment spending tend to be not robust in their predictions (cf. Cogan, Cwik,
Taylor, and Wieland, 2009). Neoclassical models with optimizing agents and
fully ﬂexible prices typically indicate a rise in output and employment but a
fall in private consumption and real wages following an exogenous increase in
government goods purchases (see e.g. Baxter and King, 1993). New Keyne-
sian sticky-price models models, on the other hand, can generate an increase
in real wages, depending on the monetary regime (see Linnemann and Sch-
abert, 2003). However, basic versions of these models also tend to predict a
crowding out of private consumption, unless additional features are included
which dampen the negative wealth eﬀect of a ﬁscal expansion. Examples
include non-Ricardian consumers (Gal´ ı, Lop´ ez-Salido, and Vall´ es, 2007), im-
perfect substitutability between public and private consumption (Linnemann
and Schabert, 2004), small wealth eﬀects on labor supply (Monacelli and
Perotti, 2008) and spending expansions followed by reversals, which cre-
ate expectations on a future fall in real interest rates (Corsetti, Meier, and
Mueller, 2009; Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Mueller, 2010).
On the empirical side the eﬀects of government spending shocks are typ-
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clude the event-study approach by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) or, more re-
cently, Ramey (2009). Despite an increasing number of papers in this ﬁeld,
many open questions do remain. In particular, the eﬀects of government
spending shocks in the euro area are largely unexplored. Indeed, even though
ﬁscal policy in the euro area is still mostly a country-speciﬁc matter, the ag-
gregate impact of ﬁscal policy is of high practical relevance for policy makers.4
Initiatives such as the EERP also indicate an interest in co-ordinated ﬁscal
policy in Europe, although the impact of such actions remains uncertain.
The scarcity of empirical results for the euro area as a whole and also for
euro area countries has been mainly due to the lack of quarterly ﬁscal data,
a limitation which has been overcome recently through a newly available
quarterly ﬁscal database for the euro area compiled by Paredes, Pedregal,
and P´ erez (2009). This data set, which covers the period 1980Q1–2008Q4,
is coherent with oﬃcial annual and quarterly national accounts data, as far
as quarterly ﬁscal data is available from national accounts (mostly for the
period 1999Q1 onwards). Based on this data set, Burriel, de Castro, Garrote,
Gordo, Paredes, and P´ erez (2009) show that the qualitative responses of
macroeconomic variables to ﬁscal shocks in a (weighted) representative euro
area country compare well with standard results for the U.S. and previous
results for some EU countries.
There is also disagreement on whether ﬁscal policy, and in particular gov-
ernment spending increases, have lost power in stimulating economic activity
over time, and if so to what extent and why. In particular, the literature lacks
empirical tests of potential explanations for the changing eﬀects of govern-
ment spending shocks. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) ﬁnd that the size of
spending multipliers on output in the U.S. varies considerably across sub-
periods. However, this paper does not provide a clear-cut explanation, based
on econometric results, for the observed changes. Similar accounts of in-
stability, based on sub-sample or rolling-windows estimation, can be found
in Perotti (2005), B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e and Cimadomo (2006), Bilbiie, Meier, and
Mueller (2006) and Caldara and Kamps (2008). These studies generally
conclude that the responses of the U.S. and of some European economies
3See e.g. Fat´ as and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005),
B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e and Cimadomo (2006), Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Mountford and
Uhlig (2009).
4In fact, several DSGE models and other quantitative models of the euro area do
already explicitly account for aggregate ﬁscal variables and aggregate ﬁscal data. See,
for example, Smets and Wouters (2003), Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2005), Christoﬀel,
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DSGE framework, Bilbiie, Meier, and Mueller (2006) show that the more
active monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period and increased asset
market participation can account for the observed decline in spending multi-
pliers in the U.S. after 1980. Finally, Perotti (2005) suggests that relaxation
of credit constraints, increasing ﬁnancial market sophistication, a stronger
real interest rate response and changes in monetary policy could explain the
decline in the eﬀects of government spending on GDP and its components.
Again, however, the above papers provide relatively little econometric evi-
dence in order to support potential explanations for changes in the eﬀects of
government spending shocks.
3 Econometric Methodology
Our empirical approach uses the techniques of Bayesian inference. We pre-
fer a Bayesian approach over estimation by classical statistical methods for
a number of reasons. Most importantly, this approach facilitates the es-
timation of time variation in multivariate linear structures and stochastic
volatility models. As discussed by Primiceri (2005), Bayesian methods are
the natural choice for the estimation of unobserved component models of this
type where the distinction between parameters and shocks is less clear than
in other models. The main advantage of Bayesian techniques in this context
is however related to the high dimensionality of such an estimation problem.
Although it would in principle be possible to write up the likelihood for the
problem, it is a hard task to maximize it over a large number of parameters.
By using prior information and by splitting up the original problem into a
few smaller steps, Bayesian methods deal eﬃciently with the high dimension
of the parameter space.5
3.1 Reduced-form VAR
We consider two alternative speciﬁcations of a reduced-form VAR of lag order
p. The ﬁrst version has ﬁxed parameters:
yt = B1yt−1 + ··· + Bpyt−p + Γzt + ut, t = 1,...,T (1)
where the vector yt includes government spending, output, private consump-
tion, the short-term interest rate and possibly other macroeconomic indica-
tors. The Bi, i = 1,...,p, are matrices of coeﬃcients. The vector zt collects
5In addition, the Bayesian approach allows for a conceptually clean way of calculating
statistics of interests such as error bands for impulse responses (see Sims and Zha, 1999).
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white noise with mean zero and covariance R.
In the second version of the VAR, we generalize speciﬁcation (1) and al-
low for time-varying coeﬃcients and heteroskedastic innovations.6 The ﬁrst
aspect allows for changes in the propagation of shocks through the economy.
The second aspect is introduced in order to allow for changes in the distri-
bution of the underlying stochastic shocks. Both features are supposed to
capture structural changes such as shifts in private sector behavior and/or
changes in the conduct of policy. Hence:
yt = B1,tyt−1 + ··· + Bp,tyt−p + Γtzt + ut, t = 1,...,T (2)
where ut ∼ NID(0,Rt).7 Stack the VAR coeﬃcients by equations in a vector
βt = vec(T ′
t), where Tt = [B1,t,...,Bp,t,Γt] and vec(·) is the column stacking
operator. This state vector of coeﬃcients is assumed to follow a driftless
random walk:8
βt = βt−1 + εt (3)
where εt ∼ NID(0,Q). The innovation covariance is Rt, which can be de-









t is lower triangular with ones on the main diagonal and Ht is
diagonal. Stack the elements below the main diagonal of At row-wise in a
vector αt. Collect the diagonal elements of Ht in a vector ht. Like the coeﬃ-
cient states, the covariance and volatility states are modeled as (geometric)
random walks:9
αt = αt−1 + νt
loght = loght−1 + ωt (5)
6Our speciﬁcation of the TVP-VAR follows Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005) and Prim-
iceri (2005). We apply some additional restrictions on the hyperparameters which are
discussed below.
7The ﬁxed coeﬃcients model (1) includes an intercept and a quadratic time trend in
zt in order to account for the presence of trends in real variables and the nominal interest
rate. A deterministic trend becomes redundant in the TVP-VAR such that zt in model
(2) includes an intercept only.
8Compared to alternative speciﬁcations such as regime switching models, the random
walk speciﬁcation has the advantage that it allows for smooth shifts as opposed to discrete
breaks in the states of the model. As discussed by Primiceri (2005), regime switching
models may well capture some of the rapid shifts in policy but they seem less suitable for
describing changes in private sector behavior where aggregation usually smoothes most of
the changes, or learning dynamics of both private agents and policy makers.
9Modeling volatilities and covariances separately instead of directly modeling the ele-
ments of the variance-covariance matrix ensures that Rt is always positive deﬁnite.
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both the diagonal elements and the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the reduced-
form covariance matrix can drift over time, thus allowing for changes in the
contemporaneous relations among the endogenous variables.
The joint distribution of shocks is postulated as [ut,εt,νt,ωt]′ ∼ NID(0,Vt),
where Vt is block diagonal with blocks Rt, Q, S and W. Notice that an unre-
stricted covariance matrix would drastically increase the number of param-
eters and complicate the estimation problem. Independence of Rt and the
hyperparameters implies that innovations to the VAR parameters are uncor-
related with the VAR innovations. This assumption seems plausible. The
VAR innovations capture business cycle events, policy shocks, or measure-
ment errors. Such short-term movements should be unrelated to long-term
institutional changes and other changes in the structure of the economy,
which are captured by movements in the VAR parameters. For example, the
introduction of the single currency in the euro area should not have been
related to technology shocks, government spending shocks, etc.
We make the additional assumption that Q, S and W are diagonal in
order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem further and to simplify
inference. The assumption of (block) diagonality of S ensures that the rows
of At evolve independently such that the covariance states can be estimated
row by row (cf. Primiceri, 2005). Diagonality of W implies that the volatility
states are independent such that the simple univariate algorithm of Jacquier,
Polson, and Rossi (1994) can be applied to each element of ut in order to
estimate the volatility states. The reduction of estimated parameters result-
ing from the diagonality restrictions on Q and S helps to save degrees of
freedom in our relatively short euro area data set. We furthermore show
in Appendix D that restricting all hyperparameter matrices to be diagonal
tends to improve the performance of the estimation algorithm.
3.2 Estimation method
Both versions of the reduced-form VAR are estimated by Bayesian methods.
For the version with ﬁxed parameters, our prior and posterior for the coef-
ﬁcient matrices Bi, i = 1,...,p, Γ, and the covariance matrix R belong to
the Normal-Wishart family with a diﬀuse prior centered on OLS estimates
over the full sample.10 For the TVP-VAR, we apply a variant of the Gibbs
sampler (see Geman and Geman, 1984; Smith and Roberts, 1993).11 We
10For details on the estimation using the Normal-Wishart distribution, see Uhlig (2005).
11See Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), Primiceri (2005), Benati and Mumtaz (2007),
Gal´ ı and Gambetti (2009) and D’Agostino, Gambetti, and Giannone (2009) for applica-
tions of Gibbs sampling algorithms to TVP-VARs.
13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1219
July 2010brieﬂy outline the main steps and refer to Appendix A for details on the
estimation algorithm. The Gibbs sampler iterates on four steps, sampling
in each step from lower dimensional conditional posteriors as opposed to the
joint posterior of the whole parameter set.
(a) VAR coeﬃcients. Conditional on the data and a history of co-
variance and volatility states, the observation equation (2) is linear with
Gaussian innovations and a known covariance matrix. The VAR coeﬃcients
can thus be sampled using the Kalman ﬁlter and a backward recursion, as
described in Carter and Kohn (1994) and Cogley and Sargent (2001).
(b) Elements of At. Conditional on the data and a history of coeﬃ-
cient and volatility states, equation (2) can be rewritten as Atut = vt, with
cov(vt) = Ht. This is a linear Gaussian state space system with independent
equations, due to the (block) diagonal structure of S (see Primiceri, 2005).
The algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) can thus be applied equation by
equation to sample the elements of At on each row below the main diagonal.
(c) Elements of Ht. Conditional on the data and a history of coeﬃ-
cient and covariance states, the orthogonalized innovations vt are observable.
Given the diagonal structure of W, we sample the diagonal elements of Ht
using the univariate algorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) element
by element, following Cogley and Sargent (2005).
(d) Hyperparameters. Conditional on the data and the parameter
states, the state innovations εt, νt and ωt are observable. This allows to draw
the hyperparameters (i.e. the elements of Q, S and W) from their respective
distributions.
Under relatively weak regularity conditions (see Roberts and Smith, 1994)
and after a suﬃciently long burn-in period, iterations on these steps produce
a realization from the joint posterior distribution. We generate 60,000 draws
from the Gibbs sampler, of which we burn the ﬁrst 50,000 to let the Markov
chain converge to its ergodic distribution. Of the remaining 10,000 draws,
we keep every 10th draw in order to break the autocorrelation of draws.12
This leaves us with 1,000 draws from the joint posterior distribution of the
model parameters. Appendix C investigates the convergence properties of
the Markov chain, concluding that these properties are overall satisfactory.
We follow conventional choices in the TVP-VAR literature in the calibra-
tion of the priors. The choices made are similar as in Primiceri (2005) but we
have a somewhat more conservative stance on the degrees of freedom of the
prior distributions which we set to the minimum value allowed for the priors
12The Gibbs sampler is a dependence chain algorithm. However, independent draws
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Unlike most previous TVP-VAR studies, we do not impose a prior re-
striction on the VAR coeﬃcients saying that draws which do not satisfy
stationarity conditions are discarded. Cogley and Sargent (2001) have pro-
posed such a restriction for U.S. monetary policy, the argument being that
the Fed conducted monetary policy in a purposeful way thus ruling out un-
stable paths of inﬂation (see Cogley and Sargent, 2005). Such a point is
harder to defend for aggregate euro area ﬁscal data since there may have
been ﬁscal instability in some countries in the past. The potential down-
side of not imposing the stationarity conditions is that this may exaggerate
the amount of time variation in the data due to a potentially large amount
of unstable draws. We therefore check the robustness of our results to the
imposition of the stationarity conditions in Section 4.3.
3.3 Data description
Our baseline VAR includes data on real government spending, real GDP,
real private consumption and the short-term nominal interest rate for the
euro area covering the period 1980Q1–2008Q4. Real GDP is our measure
of economic activity. Private consumption is included since it is the largest
component of aggregate demand. Moreover, this allows to contribute to the
ongoing discussion on the eﬀects of government spending shocks on private
consumption (see e.g. Gal´ ı et al., 2007; Perotti, 2007; Ramey, 2009). The
short-term interest rate is added to this small-scale VAR in order to assess
the impact of government spending shocks on interest rates, and potential
changes thereof.13 We also investigate the impact of government spending
shocks on a broader set of macroeconomic indicators, i.e. real private in-
vestment, the real wage, real net taxes and the annual rate of change of
the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP).14 These variables are
added all at once in the ﬁxed coeﬃcients VAR. In the speciﬁcation of the
TVP-VAR we are constrained by the need to avoid overparameterization and
exhausting available degrees of freedom. Therefore, the additional variables
are added one at a time to the baseline speciﬁcation, which limits the number
of variables in the VAR to a maximum of ﬁve indicators.
As Burriel et al. (2009), we use a newly available quarterly ﬁscal data
13Perotti (2005) argues that the long-term interest rate has a closer relation to pri-
vate consumption and investment decisions than the short-term interest rate. Replacing
the short-term interest rate by the long-term interest rate did however not lead to any
signiﬁcant changes in our results.
14We use the HICP based inﬂation rate to assess the response of inﬂation to spending
shocks due to its close link to monetary policy decisions in the euro area.
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government spending. Paredes et al. (2009) employ intra-annual ﬁscal data,
mostly on a cash basis, in a mixed-frequencies state space model to obtain
quarterly ﬁscal data for the above-mentioned period. By construction these
data are coherent with annual and quarterly national accounts data, as far as
quarterly ﬁscal data is available from national accounts. The main advantage
of this new data set is that it avoids the endogenous bias that arises if ﬁscal
data interpolated on the basis of general macroeconomic indicators were used
with macroeconomic variables to assess the impact of ﬁscal policies. Other
macroeconomic data for the euro area are taken from the ECB’s Area-Wide
Model database (Fagan et al., 2005) and the Bank of International Settle-
ments macroeconomic series.
In order to enhance comparability with the previous literature, our data
deﬁnitions closely follow related ﬁscal VAR studies (see e.g. Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005; Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Mountford and Uh-
lig, 2009; Burriel et al., 2009). In particular, government spending is deﬁned
as the sum of general government ﬁnal consumption expenditure and gross
investment. Net taxes are deﬁned as non-interest general government rev-
enue net of transfers.15 Private investment has been computed by deducting
government investment from the Paredes et al. (2009) data set from total
economy investment from the Area-Wide Model database. All of the above
variables are expressed in per capita terms.16 The real wage is measured in
hourly terms. The data are seasonally adjusted and the GDP deﬂator is used
to obtain real variables. Both the ﬁxed coeﬃcients VAR and the TVP-VAR
are estimated in levels and prior to the estimation all variables except the
interest rate were transformed into natural logarithms. Figure 1 shows the
data used in the baseline VAR speciﬁcation, expressing government spending
and private consumption as shares of GDP.
3.4 Structural interpretation
The reduced-form VAR attempts to capture a structural representation with
uncorrelated shocks. The reduced-form innovations are therefore linear trans-
formations of some underlying structural shocks et with E[ete′
t] = I, i.e.
ut = Cet, t = 1,...,T
15Following Burriel et al. (2009) transfers include all expenditure items except gov-
ernment consumption, government investment and interest payments. The general gov-
ernment primary balance is therefore obtained as the diﬀerence between net taxes and
spending as deﬁned above.
16The labor force is used as a proxy for total population, since quarterly data on total
population is not available for the entire sample period.
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ut = Ctet, t = 1,...,T
for the TVP-VAR. In particular, the residuals in the equation for government
spending can be considered as linear combinations of three types of shocks
(see Blanchard and Perotti, 2002): (1) The automatic response of spending
to movements in the business cycle, prices and interest rates. (2) The sys-
tematic discretionary response of spending to macroeconomic developments.
(3) Random discretionary innovations to spending, which are the truly struc-
tural government spending shocks of interest. Without restrictions on the
matrices C and Ct and therefore the reduced-form covariance matrix, the
above system is not identiﬁed since many combinations of structural shocks
can generate the same reduced-form innovations.
We identify government spending shocks by assuming that government
spending is predetermined in a system with output, consumption, the interest
rate and possibly other macroeconomic variables. We thereby follow Fat´ as
and Mihov (2001) who estimate a recursive VAR where government spending
is ordered ﬁrst and where the innovation in the ﬁrst equation of the VAR is
interpreted as a structural government spending shock.17 The desired linear
combination is then achieved by a Cholesky decomposition, i.e. R = CC′
and Rt = CtC′
t where C and Ct are lower triangular matrices. All variables in
the VAR are therefore allowed to respond contemporaneously to government
spending shocks but government spending does not react within a quarter
to shocks to other variables in the system. The fact that our deﬁnition
of spending does not include interest payments justiﬁes ordering spending
before the interest rate. The fact that government spending is deﬁned net
of transfer payments justiﬁes the assumption of acyclicality, i.e. there is no
automatic reaction of spending to movements in the business cycle. Similarly,
due to implementation lags in policy-making a discretionary ﬁscal response to
a change in the economy is unlikely to occur. Both assumptions are also made
in the identiﬁcation scheme due to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti
(2005), who use institutional information about the tax and transfer system
in the identiﬁcation of structural shocks. When more variables are included
in the VAR, the assumption that government spending does not react within
a quarter to shocks to those variables can be justiﬁed on similar grounds,
i.e. spending is not aﬀected contemporaneously by shocks originating in the
private sector.
17See Caldara and Kamps (2008) for a comparative study of alternative identiﬁcation
methods including the recursive approach of Fat´ as and Mihov (2001), the identiﬁcation
scheme due to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the sign restrictions approach of Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) and the event-study approach of Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
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a one-time structural shock to government spending are then computed as
follows. In the time invariant case, given a posterior (empirical) distribu-
tion of R = CC′ the matrix C gives the contemporaneous responses (at
horizon k = 0) of the endogenous variables to unitary shocks e0. Given a
distribution of VAR coeﬃcients, model (1) with uk = 0 can then be used to
calculate impulse responses at horizons k = 1,2,3,.... In the time-varying
parameters case, we apply a local approximation to the impulse responses
at time t, following e.g. Gal´ ı and Gambetti (2009). That is, the matrices
Ct are computed from the posterior distribution of reduced-form covariance
matrices Rt = CtC′
t, which give the contemporaneous impulse responses to
unitary shocks et at time t. The posterior distribution of VAR coeﬃcients at
time t is then applied to calculate the implied responses at horizon t+k, for
k = 1,2,3,..., using model (2) with ut+k = 0. This leaves us with a poste-
rior distribution of impulse responses where the responses of all variables to
spending shocks hitting the economy at time t are allowed to vary over time.
A recent criticism of the structural VAR approach for identifying ﬁscal
policy shocks centers on the fact that this approach often yields qualitatively
diﬀerent results for the U.S. than the event-study approach of Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), which builds on military episodes in order to identify exoge-
nous government spending shocks. Structural VARs tend to predict a rise in
private consumption and real wages due to spending shocks whereas event
studies usually conclude the opposite. Ramey (2009) points out that these
diﬀerences can be traced back to diﬀerences in the timing with which news
about spending increases arrives if such spending increases are anticipated in
advance of their implementation. The challenge posed by ﬁscal anticipation
eﬀects to structural VAR methods is that they may not only mismeasure
the timing of shocks but their moving average representation may have non-
fundamental roots such that structural ﬁscal shocks cannot be recovered from
past ﬁscal data (see Leeper, Walker, and Yang, 2009a).
However, the event-study approach cannot be applied in a straightforward
manner in the context of our study.18 Comparably large and easily identiﬁed
(military or other) spending increases as in the U.S. have been absent in
aggregate euro area data over the observed sample. A major exception are
the ﬁscal stimulus packages announced and adopted within the EERP in
2009–2010, but this period is not part of our sample. Even if this period
was included in the sample, the results from an application of the event-
18Other alternatives to structural VAR methods include an approach based on ﬂipping
non-fundamental roots using Blaschke matrices suggested by Mertens and Ravn (2009)
and a DSGE model based approach suggested by Kriwoluzky (2009) who estimates a
vector moving average model in order to circumvent the issue of non-invertibility.
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this one or the German reuniﬁcation. Furthermore, whether ﬁscal shocks are
truly unanticipated or not matters only if anticipated and unanticipated ﬁscal
shocks have diﬀerent eﬀects. This is a controversial empirical issue, largely
revolving around the importance of ﬁnancial constraints and other frictions.
Perotti (2005) cites empirical evidence showing that private consumption
displays large contemporaneous responses to income tax refunds and changes
in social security taxes, although both are predictable. Finally, anticipation
eﬀects are unlikely to undermine the main results of this paper on the time
variation in spending multipliers. While anticipation eﬀects might bias the
estimated impulse responses, it is not clear whether and why such eﬀects
have changed over time.
4 The Eﬀects of Spending Shocks
We organize the discussion of results in this section as follows. Section
4.1 presents the results for the ﬁxed parameters structural Bayesian VAR
(BVAR), in order to give an impression of the impact of government spend-
ing shocks over the full sample. Section 4.2 presents the evidence from the
identiﬁed TVP-VAR on time variation in the eﬀects of government spending
shocks in the euro area. Section 4.3 investigates the robustness of the TVP-
VAR results to imposing a stationarity condition on the VAR coeﬃcients.
4.1 Time invariant impulse responses
Figure 2 reports the estimated impulse responses due to the identiﬁed gov-
ernment spending shocks to the four endogenous variables yt of equation (1)
in the baseline speciﬁcation, together with their 16% and 84% probability
bands. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we report the responses of
output, consumption and spending (and later on investment and net taxes)
to the spending shock in terms of (non-accumulated) multipliers. That is,
the original impulse responses of the responding variables are divided by the
impact response of government spending and the result is divided by the
ratio of government spending and the responding variable. The rescaled im-
pulse responses can thus be interpreted to give the reaction of the responding
variable, in percent of real GDP, to a spending shock leading to an initial
increase in the level of government spending of size 1% of real GDP. For the
time invariant BVAR the ratio is evaluated at the sample mean. For the
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The government spending shock is estimated to induce a positive response
of government spending for about 20 quarters after the shock. The initial
reaction of output is positive, the estimated response being about 0.54% due
to an increase in government spending of size 1% of GDP. The output re-
sponse remains positive with 68% probability for 5 quarters after the shock
and the point estimate turns negative after 8 quarters in order to drop to
-0.34% in the medium run (13 quarters after the shock) before returning to
the baseline. The spending shock also leads to a short-run crowding-in of
private consumption. The point estimate of the impact multiplier is 0.24,
and the response of consumption is estimated to be positive with 68% prob-
ability during 5 quarters after the shock. Similarly as for output, however,
consumption is being crowded out in the medium run and the response drops
to -0.22% of GDP after 15 quarters before slowly returning to its initial level.
The nominal interest rate hardly responds to the spending shock in the ini-
tial period, but it then starts to rise and peaks at 0.23 percentage points
5 quarters after the shock and then slowly declines again. The response is
estimated to be positive with 68% probability during around 3 years.
In a next step we extend the baseline speciﬁcation by a broader set of
macroeconomic indicators which typically appear in ﬁscal VAR studies. The
impulse responses from an estimated BVAR in government spending, output,
consumption, investment, the real wage, net taxes, the HICP based inﬂation
rate and the nominal interest rate are reported in Figure 3. As a consequence
of a government spending shock leading to a rise in the level of government
spending of size 1% of GDP, net taxes increase by about 0.8% of GDP on
impact indicating an overall ﬁscal expansion since the aggregate primary
deﬁcit increases. Net taxes also return more quickly to baseline than the level
of spending such that the shock remains expansionary over the full horizon of
the impulse response. Output again tends to rise in the short to medium run
before declining below its initial level, and similarly for private consumption
and investment. The responses of output and the components of private
demand are however estimated with relatively little precision, compared to
the baseline VAR. The point estimates of the impact multipliers are 0.55
19The following example should clarify the concept. Suppose the spending shock leads
to a 2% increase in government spending. Since the share of spending over GDP is roughly
25%, this corresponds to a spending increase of about 0.5% of GDP. Say output increases
by 1% and consumption increases by 0.5%, i.e. by 0.25% of GDP since the share of
consumption over GDP is approximately 50%. The share of spending over consumption
is thus roughly 50%. The corresponding multipliers (increases in % of GDP due to a
1% of GDP increase in spending) would be calculated as (1/2)/0.25 = 2 for output and
(0.5/2)/0.5 = 0.5 for consumption.
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by approximately 0.15% on impact and remains above its initial level during
more than 12 quarters after the shock. Inﬂation shows a muted response in
the initial two quarters but it starts to increase thereafter. Monetary policy
reacts by increasing the nominal interest rate, whose response resembles that
in the baseline speciﬁcation.
Overall, these results indicate that, on average, government spending
shocks have had expansionary eﬀects on output and the components of pri-
vate demand as well as real wages in the euro area over the period 1980–2008.
In the medium to long run output declines as the components of private de-
mand are being crowded out. The increase in the nominal interest rate is
consistent with an oﬀsetting reaction of monetary policy to the ﬁscal expan-
sion in order to reduce inﬂationary pressure. In general these results compare
well with the results of previous structural VAR studies on the euro area. In
particular, they are broadly similar to those of Burriel et al. (2008), the main
previous ﬁscal VAR study for the euro area as a whole using a similar data
set. Burriel et al. (2008) also ﬁnd a positive impact of government spending
shocks on GDP and private consumption in the short to medium run and
a decline in the medium to long run, an increase in the aggregate primary
deﬁcit and a relatively persistent increase in interest rates.
4.2 Uncovering time variation
The time-varying nature of model (2) allows to examine impulse responses
for each quarter available in the sample. We start by looking at responses in
three selected quarters at the beginning, towards the middle and at the end
of the sample, i.e. 1980Q4, 1995Q4 and 2008Q4. State-dependent impulse
responses of output, consumption and the nominal interest rate to govern-
ment spending shocks in these quarters are reported in Figure 4. As in the
time invariant case, shocks are normalized to lead to an initial increase in
the level of spending of size 1% of GDP at each point of time.
The results show that the contemporaneous responses of output and con-
sumption to a government spending shock are larger at the beginning of the
sample than at the end of the sample. The point estimates of the impact
multipliers are 0.72 (output) and 0.37 (consumption) in 1980Q4 compared to
0.42 (output) and 0.28 (consumption) in 2008Q4. Moreover, the responses
of ouput and consumption have clearly lost persistence over time. The eﬀect
of a spending shock on output was positive during 6 to 7 quarters in 1980Q4,
but only during 4 to 5 quarters in 1995Q4 and 3 to 4 quarters in 2008Q4.
The time-varying techniques also uncover increasingly negative long-run con-
sequences of the ﬁscal expansion on the real economy. The response of GDP
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1.62% in 2008Q4. A less expansionary eﬀect on output goes along with a
much larger (by a factor of 2 to 3) medium to long term crowding out of
consumption. Furtermore, while the estimated impact multipliers tend to be
positive with 68% probability at the beginning of the sample, the probability
bands include the zero line at the end of the sample. On the other hand, the
decline in the long-term multipliers is signiﬁcant as most of the probability
mass has shifted downwards. We also note a change in the response of the
nominal interest rate. The initial reaction of the interest rate to a spend-
ing shock was negative in 1980Q4, close to zero in 1995Q4, and positive in
2008Q4.
The conclusions from Figure 4 are conﬁrmed in Figure 5, which shows
state-dependent median impulse responses over the whole sample. Only the
fourth-quarter response in each year is reported such that the ﬁrst impulse
response reported refers to 1980Q4 while the last one refers to 2008Q4. One
can again observe that the eﬀect of government spending on output and
consumption has become signiﬁcantly weaker and less persistent over time
and that the nominal interest rate tends to respond more strongly to spending
shocks. Yet the ﬁgure also reveals that the expansionary short-run eﬀect on
output and consumption peaks towards the end of the 1980s before declining
until the most recent decade. Long-term multipliers have steadily declined
over the observed sample. It is also obvious that the shape of the response
of government spending to the spending shock has remained rather stable
over time. The persistence of spending does not show any important time
variation.
In Figure 6 we plot the impulse responses of all variables over time at
selected horizons, i.e. the contemporaneous responses, the responses after
one year and the responses after ﬁve years. Again, we can observe that the
response of government spending has remained relatively stable over time.
The impact multiplier on output was slightly below one in the period 1980–
1985, it increased above one in the period 1985–1990, and it then decreased
to values below 0.5 until 2008. At a horizon of ﬁve years the multipliers
on output and consumption tend to have declined substantially from values
between -0.7 and -1 in the 1980s to values between -1.4 and -1.7 in the
recent decade. In general the output multiplier follows the movements of
the multiplier on private consumption. The initial reaction of the interest
rate was negative until around 1999–2002, and it turned positive afterwards.
The medium to long run response of the interest rate has also increased over
time. A stronger response of the nominal interest rate–consistent with a less
accommodative stance of monetary policy towards the ﬁscal expansion–thus
seems to have contributed to the observed decline in spending multipliers.
22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1219
July 2010We also investigate the time-varying eﬀects of government spending shocks
on a broader set of macroeconomic indicators, adding one at a time private
investment, net taxes, the real wage and the HICP based inﬂation rate to
the estimated VAR. Figures 7 and 8 show the estimated state-dependent
impulse responses. We observe a small positive short-term eﬀect of spend-
ing shocks on private investment and a medium to long-term crowding out.
Similarly as the multipliers on output and consumption, the multiplier on
private investment was larger in the ﬁrst part of the sample. Yet the decline
in the estimated multiplier has started to take place somewhat later after
the year 2000. We note that the reaction of net taxes to government spend-
ing shocks has remained comparably stable over time, and throughout the
response is smaller than 1% of GDP indicating that the primary deﬁcit has
always increased due to the spending shock. A smaller overall ﬁscal expan-
sion can thus not hold as an explanation for smaller spending multipliers.
The response of the real wage shows more time variation. It was positive
for several quarters after the shock throughout the sample, but we observe
a larger initial reaction and a more persistent response in the ﬁrst part of
the sample. In general the real wage response is similar to the consumption
response and it was strongest towards the end of the 1980s.
The initial response of inﬂation was close to zero over the whole sam-
ple, but we observe a stronger response over the medium term during the
1980s and most of the 1990s. Since the nominal interest rate reacts more
strongly to government spending shocks, this result implies that the real in-
terest rate response has tended to increase over time. Agents save more and
consume and invest less which means that private demand decreases. Firms
respond by decreasing output. If prices are sticky, real wages tend to in-
crease after an expansionary spending shock but given a weaker response of
private demand they seem to have done so less in more recent times. Dis-
posable income would therefore respond less strongly to the ﬁscal expansion
and if liquidity constraints play a role, consumers would tend to consume
less which reinforces the negative eﬀect on private demand. This and other
possible determinants of the observed time variation in spending multipliers
will be addressed further in Section 5.
4.3 Robustness: imposing stationarity conditions
Cogley and Sargent (2001) have proposed to impose a prior restriction on
the VAR coeﬃcients saying that draws from the Gibbs sampler which do
not satisfy stationarity conditions are discarded. We have argued above that
such a restriction is diﬃcult to defend for aggregate euro area ﬁscal data
since there may have been instability in the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in some
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conditions is that this may exaggerate the amount of time variation in the
data due to a potentially large amount of unstable draws. We therefore check
the robustness of our main results to imposing the stationarity conditions.
Formally, the random walk process (3) for the VAR coeﬃcients βt, t =
1,...,T, characterizes the conditional density f(βt|βt−1,Q). Following Cog-
ley and Sargent (2001), we introduce an indicator function I(βt) which rejects
unstable draws not satisfying standard eigenvalue stability conditions and
which thus enforces stationarity of the estimated TVP-VAR at each point of
time. The VAR coeﬃcients are thus postulated to evolve according to
p(βt|βt−1,Q) = I(βt)f(βt|βt−1,Q)
Figure 9 shows state-dependent impulse response in the baseline VAR
following a positive government spending shock of size 1% of GDP, with the
stationarity conditions imposed. A comparison with Figure 5 indicates no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences to the previous results with respect to the eﬀects on
output and private consumption. The interest rate response shows somewhat
less high-frequency variation but the broad patterns are similar to the previ-
ous results. Overall, imposing the stationarity conditions does therefore lead
to very little changes in the main results documented above.
5 The Fiscal Transmission Mechanism
This section exploits the results obtained so far with the aim of identifying
the determinants of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in the euro area. We ﬁrst
provide an account of existing views on the ﬁscal transmission mechanism
in Section 5.1. We then investigate the driving forces of time variation in
spending multipliers using regression analysis in Section 5.2. Section 5.3
checks the robustness of the regression results.
5.1 Views on the transmission mechanism
Several potential determinants of the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy have re-
ceived some attention recently: (i) the level of government debt, (ii) asset
market participation and access to credit, (iii) the degree of trade openness.
Using regression analysis we relate these factors to the observed time vari-
ation in spending multipliers. In addition, we study the eﬀects of the com-
position of government spending according to (iv) the share of government
investment and (v) the wage component of total spending. Before turning
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mission mechanism according to the above-mentioned determinants.
(i) Government debt. Experience from past ﬁscal consolidations sug-
gests the possibility that in times of ﬁscal stress, characterized by high
debt-to-GDP ratios, an economy’s response to ﬁscal shocks changes quali-
tatively. That is, positive consumption growth was observed after prolonged
and substantial deﬁcit cuts. This is the hypothesis of “expansionary ﬁscal
contractions” brought about by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).20 Investigating
a quarterly panel of 19 OECD countries, Perotti (1999) ﬁnds that the eﬀect of
spending shocks on consumption can be positive if the initial ﬁnancing needs
of the government are small. He argues that the eﬀect from initial conditions
comes from the convexity of tax distortions: a (larger) expected increase
in taxation tomorrow causes a (larger) decline in wealth and (larger) fall
in consumption today. A signiﬁcant and sustained reduction of government
spending may then lead consumers to expect a permanent future tax cut and
an increase in permanent income, leading to a rise in private consumption.
(ii) Credit. Another important channel through which spending shocks
may aﬀect the economy is the degree of asset market participation and the
stringency of credit constraints. In the standard neoclassical model and in
the basic New Keynesian model, expansionary government spending shocks
tend to generate a crowding out of private consumption and therefore rela-
tively small multipliers on GDP. The reason is the negative wealth eﬀect on
consumers induced by higher future tax payments, which makes them save
more and consume less due to the consumption smoothing objective. How-
ever, credit constraints and limited asset market participation may dampen
this eﬀect and induce non-Ricardian behavior by consumers. If private agents
consume a high share of their after-tax income, or if they are constrained in
their access to credit, they do not or cannot save against a higher future
tax burden. Gal´ ı et al. (2007) show that a government spending shock can
generate an increase in aggregate consumption in a New Keynesian model
conditional on having a relatively large fraction of liquidity constrained con-
sumers (around 30%–50% of the population).
In addition, it has recently been argued that ﬁscal policy may be more
eﬀective in stabilizing real economic activity in periods of recessions. The
reason is that in recessions credit constraints might bind across a wider range
20See also Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000). Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) study
episodes of large ﬁscal consolidations in Denmark during 1983–1986 and in Ireland during
1987-1989. In these episodes the cyclically adjusted deﬁcit as a share of GDP declined by
9.5% and 7.2% relative to the preconsolidation year and yet private consumption increased
by 17.7% and 14.5% cumulatively. Alesina and Perotti (1996) identify similar episoes in
several other European countries and Canada during the 1980s.
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and in ’t Veld (2009) allow for credit constrained households along the lines
of the ﬁnancial accelerator literature, thus allowing the stringency of credit
constraints to vary over the business cycle. They argue that ﬁscal policy
becomes a more eﬀective tool for short-run economic stabilization, since the
marginal propensity to consume out of current income increases during re-
cessions. Tagkalakis (2008) provides empirical evidence for asymmetric ef-
fects of ﬁscal policy for a panel of nineteen OECD countries over the period
1970–2002. He shows that a spending shock has a larger eﬀect on private
consumption in downturns than in upturns.
(iii) Openness. It is often claimed that ﬁscal multipliers depend on the
degree of openness to trade.22 In very open economies, domestic output will
remain largely unaﬀected by a ﬁscal expansion since a large fraction of the
intended stimulus falls on imports. Multipliers should then be smaller in
Europe than, for instance, in the U.S. since Europe is more open towards
international trade. Using a panel VAR approach, Beetsma, Giuliodori, and
Klaassen (2008) show that a 1% of GDP increase in public spending in the
European Union leads to a fall of the trade balance by 0.5% of GDP on
impact and a peak fall of 0.8% of GDP, due to rising imports and falling
exports. This compares to a 1.2% impact eﬀect and a 1.6% peak rise in
GDP due to the spending shock. With respect to time variation in ﬁscal
multipliers, the eﬀects of an increase in spending on GDP are then expected
to be smaller the higher the degree of openness. Below we use the import
share as a proxy for the degree of openness since the theory indicates that
imports are the channel through which openness to trade should eﬀect ﬁscal
multipliers, whereas the eﬀects of exports are less clear-cut.
(iv) Government investment. Although not all empirical studies ﬁnd
a growth-enhancing eﬀect of public capital, there is now more consensus than
in the past that public capital furthers economic growth.23 It therefore seems
important to investigate whether any change in the composition of spending
according to consumption and investment expenditures has contributed to a
changing spending multiplier. From a theoretical perspective, general equi-
21In fact, empirical evidence suggests that asset market constraints on households and/or
ﬁrms are more severe in recessions than in expansions. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Fissel and Japelli (1990), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1996) and Garc´ ıa, Lusardi, and Ng (1997).
22For instance, Perotti (2005) touches upon this claim but he argues that the increase in
openness is probably too small to account for the decline in spending multipliers in OECD
economies.
23See Romp and de Haan (2007) for a survey of empirical studies on the link between
public capital and economic growth.
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in government investment can generate larger ﬁscal multipliers than increases
in government consumption, so long as public capital is even slightly produc-
tive (see e.g. Baxter and King, 1993; Pappa, 2005; Straub and Tchakarov,
2007). The reason is that government investment has the aggregate demand
eﬀect of government absorption but also an additional aggregate supply ef-
fect by enhancing production and the marginal productivity of private labor
and capital.
On the other hand, Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009b) have recently pro-
vided evidence that government investment projects in the U.S. are subject
to substantial implementation lags. Delays between the authorization of a
government spending plan and the completion of an investment project lead
to a smaller or negative short-term multiplier, even if public capital is pro-
ductive. Private investment and employment are then postponed until the
public capital is on line such that in the short run private investment is lower
and labor impacts may be small or even negative. Output can therefore fall
in the short run in response to an increase in government investment.
(v) Wage component. More than half of government spending in the
euro area consists of wage payments to government employees. Several stud-
ies emphasize that the distinction between goods purchases and employee
compensation is important when assessing the impact of spending shocks on
the macroeconomy. Finn (1998) shows that shocks to government employ-
ment tend to have diﬀerent eﬀects than shocks to goods purchases in the
neoclassical model. Employment shocks tend to raise the real wage and thus
act as a transfer to households, which dampens the (negative) wealth eﬀect
on consumption and labor supply. Pappa (2005) demonstrates that govern-
ment employment shocks have similar eﬀects in a New Keynesian model.
Using structural VAR analysis, Perotti (2007) shows that the responses of
output and private consumption in the U.S. tend to be larger in response to
a government employment shock compared to a goods spending shock.
An alternative interpretation of the eﬀects of government employment
and wages has recently been provided by Alesina and Ardagna (2009) in the
context of an imperfect labor market, which is typically absent in both the
standard neoclassical model and the basic New Keynesian model. They argue
that a decrease in government employment reduces the probability of ﬁnd-
ing a job if not employed in the private sector, and a decrease in government
wages decreases the worker’s income if employed in the public sector. In both
cases, the reservation utility of union members goes down and the wage de-
manded by the union for private sector workers decreases, increasing proﬁts,
investment and competitiveness. According to this argument, an increase in
the wage component of government spending could lead to a smaller eﬀect on
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employment and wages, and we investigate below whether any adjustments
in the composition of government spending in terms of goods purchases and
employee compensation might have contributed to the observed changes in
the eﬀects of government spending shocks in the euro area.
5.2 Driving forces of time variation
Several testable hypotheses can be derived from Section 5.1. First, the eﬀects
of spending shocks on output and consumption are expected to be smaller
the higher the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, spending multipliers can be
higher if households are more restricted in their access to credit, or if actual
output is below potential output. Third, a higher share of imports over
GDP is expected to lead to smaller spending multipliers. Fourth, a higher
government investment share can lead to higher spending multipliers but if
implementation lags play a role short-term multipliers can be smaller. Fifth,
a higher wage share can result in larger or smaller eﬀects on economic activity
according to the degree of labor market competitiveness. In this section
we address those various hypotheses by means of regression analysis. We
apply Bayesian linear regressions, using the government spending multipliers
on output and consumption from Section 4.2 as dependent variables.24 We
distinguish both short-run eﬀects on contemporaneous multipliers and long-
term eﬀects on multipliers after ﬁve years. The fact that the dependent
variables are estimated parameters, which may lead to biased standard errors,
is addressed in Section 5.3.
Figure 10 shows the explanatory factors used in the regression analysis.
The lagged aggregate euro area debt-to-GDP ratio is used to measure the
initial ﬁnancing needs of euro area governments. Access to credit is mea-
sured by the lagged ratio of credit to households over GDP.25 The state of
the business cycle is approximated by the lagged HP-ﬁltered output gap.
Lagged values are used to address reverse causation from spending multi-
24We specify diﬀuse normal priors with mean zero and standard deviation 106 for the
regression coeﬃcients. In all regressions we control for a constant and a linear trend,
in order to address potential concerns of spurious causation. Controlling for quadratic
trend instead of a linear trend did not lead to any signiﬁcant changes in the results.
We furthermore account for the possible presence of heteroskedastic disturbances using
diﬀuse priors on the variance terms. The regressions are estimated using a Gibbs sampling
algorithm with 1,100 draws dropping the ﬁrst 100 draws, see Geweke (1993) for details.
25We use the amount of outstanding loans to households in each quarter. The quarterly
credit ratio is computed by dividing this measure by the sum of nominal GDP over the last
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ratio of imports over GDP (in lagged terms) is used to assess the impact of
changes in the degree of openness on spending multipliers. Finally, we use
the contemporaneous shares of government investment and employee com-
pensation over total spending in order to assess the impact of changes in the
composition of spending.
A ﬁrst set of regression results is documented in Table 1. Using the
medians of the contemporaneous multipliers on output and consumption as
dependent variables, the explanatory factors are added one by one to the
regression equations. The point estimates of the regression coeﬃcients are
the means of their posterior distribution. The statistical “signiﬁcance” of
the regression coeﬃcients is measured in terms of the posterior probability
that they are non-positive (non-negative) if their point estimates are positive
(negative).
The results indicate that an increase in the share of government debt over
GDP has had a negative impact on contemporaneous spending multipliers.
A one percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio has caused on
average a decline in the multiplier on output by 0.01 points in all regression
speciﬁcations considered except (1), whose explanatory power is however
relatively low. Given an increase in the debt ratio by about 30 percentage
points over the period 1980–2008, this is a fairly large contribution. The
eﬀect on the multiplier on consumption is closer to zero.
We also estimate a negative eﬀect on the size of spending multipliers of
an increase in the ratio of credit to households over GDP. A one percent-
age point increase in the credit ratio leads on average to a decline in the
spending multiplier on output (consumption) between 0.04 and 0.06 points
(between 0.01 and 0.02 points). The credit ratio has increased from 30% in
1980 to almost 60% in 2008, such that increasing credit availability is esti-
mated to have contributed substantially to the observed decline in spending
multipliers. The output gap does however enter with an unexpected positive
sign, but the coeﬃcient on the multiplier on output is only positive with 90%
probability in the largest regression model (6).
A rise in the share of imports over GDP is estimated to have a negative
eﬀect on the size of spending multipliers, a one percentage point increase in
the import share leading on average to a decline in the multipliers on output
and consumption by 0.01 points (except in the largest regression model for
consumption). Finally, the impact of an increase in the share of government
investment in total spending is estimated to be positive whereas an increase
in the share of wage payments in total spending leads to a decline in spend-
ing multipliers. In the largest regression model for the output (consumption)
multiplier, a one percentage point increase of the investment share is esti-
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points). A one percentage point increase in the wage share, however, leads
to an average decrease in the multiplier by 0.05 points (0.01 points). We
note that the adjusted R2 is highest in regressions (6) and (12), providing
support for the inclusion of all explanatory variables considered.
The results using median long-term spending multipliers after ﬁve years
as dependent variables are reported in Table 2. In the discussion of results, we
focus on the largest regression models (6) and (12). The results show that the
output gap now enters with a negative sign, whereas the impact of the credit
ratio and the debt ratio remains negative. On average, a one percentage point
increase in the output gap leads to a decline in the long-term multipliers on
output and consumption by 0.02 points and 0.01 points, respectively. A one
percentage point increase in the credit ratio or the debt ratio lead to a decline
in the spending multiplier on output by 0.01 points. The marginal eﬀects on
the consumption multiplier are again closer to zero. The impact of the import
share, the share of government investment in total spending and the wage
share on the long-term multiplier on output is negligible. On the other hand,
the impact of imports on the consumption multiplier is positive in the long-
term. Contrary to the short-term multiplier, a higher wage share is estimated
to have a positive impact on the long-term multiplier on consumption albeit
with a small coeﬃcient.
5.3 Robustness: standard error adjustment
A note of caution on the regression results reported in Tables 1 and 2 is in
place. We have used the point estimates of spending multipliers as depen-
dent variables in those regressions. However, the multipliers are themselves
estimated parameters. This may give a biased view of the importance of
the restrictions implied by the explanatory variables and artiﬁcially produce
signiﬁcant eﬀects even when the “true” ones are negligible (see Canova and
Pappa, 2006). One should therefore account for the uncertainty in the depen-
dent variables, i.e. one needs to adjust the standard errors of the regression
coeﬃcients. We address this issue in the following way. We use each of 1,000
multipliers in the posterior distribution from the identiﬁed TVP-VAR in turn
as dependent variable. Similar as above, we then generate 1,100 draws from
the Gibbs sampler and omit the ﬁrst 100 draws for each regression. This
leaves us with 1,000,000 draws from the posterior distribution of regression
coeﬃcients from which we compute means and posterior probabilities. The
results for contemporaneous multipliers and long-term spending multipliers,
respectively, are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
The results in Table 3 show that the point estimates are similar but–
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previously, leading to the conclusion that some of them do not have an impact
(with at least 90% probability) on contemporaneous spending multipliers.
The coeﬃcient on the ratio of credit to households over GDP is however still
negative with at least 99% probability. In regression (6) a one percentage
point increase in the credit ratio leads on average to a decrease by 0.06 points
(0.04 points) in the spending multiplier on output (consumption). Similarly,
the share of government investment in total spending keeps to have a positive
eﬀect on spending multipliers, and the eﬀect of government wages is again
negative. The output gap is again estimated to have a positive eﬀect of
contemporaneous multipliers. However, government debt and imports drop
as potential explanations for the eﬀects of government spending on output
and consumption according to regressions (6) and (12).
Table 4 indicates that accounting for the uncertainty in the dependent
variables has an even larger impact on our results for the long-term spending
multipliers. Only the ratio of government debt over GDP remains with a non-
negligible eﬀect on long-term multipliers. For both the multiplier on output
and the multiplier on consumption, a one percentage point increase in the
debt ratio leads on average to a decline by 0.01 points in the multipliers, the
eﬀect being negative with at least 95% probability in all regression models.
The remaining variables stay with their previous signs, but their standard
errors are too large for them to be signiﬁcant driving forces of the ﬁscal
transmission mechanism.
In summary, the second-stage regressions indicate that (i) the level of
government debt has an adverse impact on the size of spending multipliers
especially in the long run whereas its short-term impact turns unimportant
once we account for the uncertainty in estimated multipliers. (ii) The ratio
of credit over GDP is the main driving force of the observed time variation
in contemporaneous spending multipliers. However, this eﬀect does not im-
mediately feed through to a higher eﬀect of government spending on output
or consumption during recessions. The output gap only has the expected
negative eﬀect on spending multipliers in the long run, but this eﬀect cancels
once we adjust standard errors. (iii) The negative impact on (short-term)
multipliers of the degree of openness–measured by the share of imports over
GDP–disappears once we control for the uncertainty in the dependent vari-
ables. With respect to compositional eﬀects, (iv) a higher share of govern-
ment investment in total spending has a positive eﬀect on the size of spending
multipliers in the short run, even when standard errors are adjusted. Finally,




Working Paper Series No 1219
July 20106 Conclusions
This paper has speciﬁed and estimated time-varying parameters vector au-
toregressions, with the aim of investigating changes in the eﬀects of gov-
ernment spending shocks in the euro area over the period 1980–2008 and
revealing the driving forces of the time variation of spending multipliers.
Our results indicate that–despite a relatively stable total ﬁscal impulse–
the eﬀectiveness of spending shocks in stimulating economic activity has
decreased over time. Short-run spending multipliers increased until the late
1980s when they reached values above unity, but they started to decline af-
terwards to values closer to 0.5 in the current decade. Long-term multipliers
show a more than two-fold decline since the 1980s. These results suggest that
other components of aggregate demand are increasingly being crowded out by
spending based ﬁscal expansions. In particular, the response of private con-
sumption to government spending shocks has become substantially weaker
over time. We also document a weaker response of real wages, whereas the
nominal interest rate shows a stronger reaction to spending shocks.
With respect to the driving forces of time variation, our evidence points
towards access to credit as one of the main determinants of short-term spend-
ing multipliers. This ﬁnding lends empirical support to the view that access
to credit matters for the eﬀectiveness of discretionary ﬁscal stimulus. The
argument is that the presence of credit constraints and limited asset market
participation reduces the importance of Ricardian equivalence, since a larger
share of agents cannot borrow or save immediately against a higher future
tax burden. The result that real wages show a weaker response to spending
shocks seems also consistent with this view. It implies that current income
reacts less strongly to spending shocks, which leads to a smaller increase in
the consumption of credit constrained consumers.
We also conclude that a lower share of government investment and a
larger wage component in total spending may have contributed to the ob-
served decline in short-term multipliers. These ﬁndings support the argument
that government investment may have an additional positive aggregate sup-
ply eﬀect in addition to the aggregate demand eﬀect of government goods
purchases. However, implementation lags do not seem to aﬀect the size of
spending multipliers since in that case we would expect a smaller short-term
impact and larger long-term eﬀects. The negative eﬀect of wage payments
on spending multipliers is consistent with arguments on the potential ad-
verse consequences of increases in government employment and wages in an
imperfect labor market.
Finally, our results suggest that rising government debt is the main reason
for declining spending multipliers at longer horizons, and thus increasingly
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as an indication that further accumulating debt after a spending shock leads
to rising concerns on the sustainability of public ﬁnances, such that agents
may expect a larger ﬁscal consolidation in the future which depresses private
demand and output. We also ﬁnd that a stronger response of the short-term
nominal interest rate goes along with declining spending multipliers. This
result is consistent with an increasingly oﬀsetting reaction of monetary policy
to the expansionary ﬁscal shock.
An important issue for future research would be to investigate the cross-
country dimension of time variation in ﬁscal multipliers. Next to the fact
that it would be useful to assess the robustness of our results for the aggre-
gate euro area at the country level, such an investigation could contribute to
the present study by adding variation in ﬁscal multipliers as well as explana-
tory variables. This would facilitate the identiﬁcation of the factors which
determine the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy, thus helping to further enhance
our understanding of the ﬁscal transmission mechanism.
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This appendix outlines the details of the Gibbs sampling algorithm used for estimation
of the TVP-VAR. The algorithm generates a Markov chain which is a sample the joint
posterior distribution of the VAR parameters (i.e. coeﬃcient states, covariance states,
volatility states and hyperparameters). It combines elements of Cogley and Sargent (2005),
Primiceri (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007), with a few additional restrictions on the
structure of the hyperparameters. In what follows, xt denotes the history of x up to time
t, i.e. xt = [x′
1,x′
2,...,x′
t]′ and T denotes the sample length. Furthermore, rewrite the
observation equation (2) conveniently as
yt = X′
tβt + ut (A.1)
where X′
t = I ⊗ [y′
t−1,...,y′
t−p,z′
t]. The estimation proceeds in four steps.
Drawing coeﬃcient states βT. Conditional on AT and HT one obtains a history
RT. Then, conditional on yT, RT and Q, the observation equation (2) is linear with Gaus-
sian innovations and a known covariance matrix. The posterior density of the coeﬃcients









The conditional means and variances can be computed using the Kalman ﬁlter and a
backward recursion (see Carter and Kohn, 1994). The Kalman ﬁlter delivers
Pt|t−1 = Pt−1|t−1 + Q
Kt = Pt|t−1Xt(X′
tPt|t−1Xt + Rt)−1
βt|t = βt−1|t−1 + Kt(yt − X′
tβt−1|t−1)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 − KtX′
tPt|t−1
The initial values β0|0 for this recursion are the OLS point estimates from the initial
sample, and the initial value P0|0 is their covariance matrix. The initial Rt is the OLS
covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR. The covariance matrix Q is a scaled version
of the variance-covariance matrix of the coeﬃcients.
The Kalman ﬁlter delivers as its last points βT|T and PT|T. Draws from (A.2) are then
obtained by a backward recursion. The ﬁrst point in the backward recursion is a draw
from N(βT|T,PT|T). The remaining draws are from N(βt|t+1,Pt|t+1) where the means
and variances are derived as follows:
βt|t+1 = βt|t + Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t(βt+1 − βt|t)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t − Pt|tP
−1
t+1|tPt|t
26We omit conditioning factors which are redundant in the respective step.
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of equations (A.1) as
At(yt − X′
tβt) = At  yt = H
1/2
t vt (A.3)
Moreover, At is lower diagonal (with ones on the main diagonal) such that (A.3) can be
rewritten as
  yt = Ztαt + H
1/2
t vt (A.4)
where αt is deﬁned as in the main text and Zt has the structure
Zt =

   
  

0 ··· ··· 0
−  y1,t 0 ···
. . .





0 ··· 0 (−  y1,t,··· ,−  yn−1,t)

   
  

where n denotes the number of variables in the VAR. The system of equations (A.4) has
a Gaussian but non-linear state-space form. However, under the assumption of (block)
diagonality of S the problem becomes linear (see Primiceri, 2005). The forward (Kalman
ﬁlter) and backward recursions of the previous step can then be applied equation by
equation. Hence, the procedure allows to recover αT by
αi,t|t+1 = E[αi,t|αi,t+1,yt,βT,HT,Si]
Λi,t|t+1 = var[αi,t|αi,t+1,yt,βT,HT,Si]
where αi,t is the block of αt corresponding to the i-th equation and Si is the associated i-th
block of S. The initial values for the Kalman ﬁlter are obtained from a decomposition of
the OLS covariance matrix, using the prior mean and the prior variance of α0 as described
in Appendix B.
Drawing volatility states HT. To sample the stochastic volatilities the univari-
ate algorithm of Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) is applied each element of Ht. The
orthogonalized residuals vt = Atut are observable conditional on yT, βT and AT. We can
use the univariate setting because the stochastic volatilities are assumed to be indepen-
dent, following Cogley and Sargent (2005). Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) show that
the conditional kernel is
f(hi,t|h−i,t,vT
i ,wi) ∝ f(hi,t|hi,t−1,hi,t+1,vT
i ,wi)
where wi is the i-th diagonal element of W and h−i,t represents the vector of h’s at all
other dates. Using Bayes’ theorem the above conditional kernel can be expressed as
f(hi,t|hi,t−1,hi,t+1,vT

















where µi,t and σ2
ic are the conditional mean and variance of hi,t implied by (5) and knowl-
edge of hi,t−1 and hi,t+1. For a geometric random walk these parameters are
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July 2010In practice hi,t+1 is taken from the previous Gibbs iteration.27 Jacquier, Polson, and
Rossi (1994) propose a Metropolis step instead of a Gibbs step, because the normalizing
constant is expensive to calculate in (A.5). Hence, one draws from a stand-in density and
then uses the conditional likelihood f(ui,t|hi,t) to calculate the acceptance probability for














































i,t if the draw is rejected. This algorithm is applied on a date by date basis
to each element of ut. The formulas are slightly diﬀerent for the ﬁrst and last element.

















and the acceptance probability is 1 since there is no previous draw. For the last element
we have
µiT = loghi,t−1 and σ2
ic = wi
where the prior on the distribution of logh0, providing values for the mean µi0 and the
variance σ2
hi0, is described in Appendix B.
Drawing hyperparameters. The hyperparameters of the model are the covari-
ance matrices of the innovations, i.e. Q (coeﬃcient states), S (covariance states), and
W (volatility states). Conditional on yT, βT, AT and HT, these state innovations are
observable. Since the hyperparameters are assumed to be independent, each covariance
matrix can be drawn from its respective distribution.
Since we have restricted the hyperparameter matrix Q to be diagonal, its diagonal
elements qi have univariate inverse Gamma distributions with scale parameter γ
q
i,1 and


























i,t (see e.g. Kim and Nelson, 1999).
Similarly, restricting S to be diagonal, each of its diagonal elements si has an inverse
Gamma distribution with scale parameter γs












27In the ﬁrst iteration, we use squared orthogonalized residuals v2
i,t in order to initialize the volatilities,
which are obtained from the application of the OLS estimates from the initial sample on the actual sample.
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1 = δs






Finally, the diagonal elements wi of W have univariate inverse Gamma distributions
with scale parameter γw




















Summary. The Gibbs sampling algorithm is summarized as follows:
1. Initialize RT, Q, S and W.
2. Draw coeﬃcients βT from f(βT|yT,RT,Q).
3. Draw covariances AT from f(AT|yT,HT,S).
4. Draw volatilities HT from f(HT|yT,βT,AT,W).
5. Draw hyperparameters from f(qi|yT,βT), f(si|yT,AT) and f(wi|yT,HT).
6. Go to step 2.
B Calibration of the priors
This appendix discusses the choice of our priors. We closely follow common choices in
the TVP-VAR literature and impose relatively conservative priors, particularly on the
amount of time variation in the data (see e.g. Cogley and Sargent, 2001; Cogley and
Sargent, 2005; Primiceri, 2005; Benati and Mumtaz, 2007). However, unlike most previous
studies those priors are not calibrated based on OLS estimates from an initial “training
sample” which is then discarded. This would mean sacriﬁcing part of our already relatively
short sample. Instead, we calibrate our priors based on OLS estimates from the full sample.
Such a strategy is suggested by Canova (2007) and Canova and Ciccarelli (2009) for cases
where a training sample is not available. A ﬁxed-coeﬃcient VAR model is thus estimated
by OLS (equation by equation) on the full sample from 1980Q1–2008Q4.
VAR coeﬃcients. Let ˆ β denote the OLS estimate of the VAR coeﬃcients, and   Ξ
their covariance matrix. We set
β0 ∼ N(ˆ β,4 ×   Ξ)
where the variance scaling factor increases the uncertainty about the size of the VAR
coeﬃcients in the initial sample versus the actual sample.
Elements of Ht. Denote the OLS estimate of the VAR covariance matrix as   Σ. We
apply a triangular decomposition of this matrix similar to (4),   Σ =   Ψ−1  Φ(  Ψ−1)′, and
denote the vector of diagonal elements of   Φ as φ0. Our prior for the diagonal elements of
the matrix Ht is
h0 ∼ N(φ0,10 × I)
The variance scaling factor 10 is arbitrary but large relative to the mean φ0.
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ordered by rows. The prior for the elements of At is
α0 ∼ N(ψ0,10 × diag(ψ0))
where the variance of α0 is scaled up taking into the magnitude of the respective elements
of the mean ψ0, as in Benati and Mumtaz (2007).
Hyperparameters. The prior on the diagonal elements of the coeﬃcient state error















i,0 = kQ × ˆ ξi, where ˆ ξi denotes the i-th diagonal element of the OLS covariance
matrix   Ξ and kQ = 10−4. Hence, our prior attributes only 0.01% of the uncertainty
surrounding the OLS estimates to time variation following Cogley and Sargent (2001).
The degrees of freedom δ
q
0 are set to 1, which is the minimum for the prior to be proper.
We thus put as little weight on the prior as possible.
The prior on the diagonal elements of the hyperparameter matrix S for the covariance












i,0 = kS × ˆ ψi, where ˆ ψi denotes the i-th diagonal element of the OLS covariance
matrix   Ψ and kS = 10−2. Here we follow Primiceri (2005), who makes similar choices for
a block diagonal structure of S. The degrees of freedom δs
0 are again set to the minimum
value of 1.













i,0 = kW. We set kW = 10−4 and δw
0 = 1. The parameters of the distribution are
the same as in Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Benati and Mumtaz (2007).
C Convergence of the Markov chain
This appendix assesses the convergence of the Markov chain produced by the Gibbs sam-
pler. We apply three types of convergence checks to the VAR coeﬃcients, the covariances
and the volatilities.28 We omit the hyperparameters, since these are not the direct objects
of the analysis in this paper.
The ﬁrst convergence check is the diagnostics due to Raftery and Lewis (1992), which
is used to assess the total number of iterations required to achieve a certain precision, and
the minimum burn-in period and thinning factor. The parameters for the diagnostic are
speciﬁed as follows: quantile = 0.025; desired accuracy = 0.025; required probability of
attaining the required accuracy = 0.95. We generate a Markov chain with 5,000 draws
28See Koop (2003), chapter 4, for a review of convergence diagnostics.
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Table 5 reports the diagnostics. For all three state vectors, the required number of runs is
far below the total number of iterations actually applied. The same holds for the number
of burn-in replications and the thinning factor. The choices made to generate the Markov
chain therefore seem appropriate.
Our second convergence diagnostic are the ineﬃciency factors (IFs) for the posterior
estimates of the parameters. The IF is the inverse of Geweke’s (1989) relative numerical
eﬃciency measure, i.e. IF = 1 + 2
 ∞
k=1 ρk, where ρk is the k-th order autocorrelation of
the chain. This diagnostic therefore serves to judge how well the chain mixes. Low auto-
correlations suggest that the draws are close to independent, which increases the eﬃciency
of the algorithm (Primiceri, 2005). We use a 4% tapered window for the estimation of
the spectral density at frequency zero. Values of the IFs below or around 20 are regarded
as satisfactory, according to Primiceri (2005). The left panels of Figure 11 report the IFs
for the state vectors. The IFs are far below 20 for the coeﬃcients and the covariances,
but around 30-35 for the volatilities. Compared to the results reported e.g. in Primiceri
(2005) and considering the higher dimensionality of our problem, however, these results
still seem satisfactory.
The ﬁnal convergence test applied is the convergence diagnostic (CD) due to Geweke
(1992). This diagnostic is based on the idea that, if a suﬃciently large number of draws
have been taken, the posterior estimates based on the ﬁrst half of draws should be es-
sentially the same as the estimates based on the second half of draws. If they are very
diﬀerent, either too few draws have been taken and estimates are inaccurate or the eﬀects
of the initial values of the chain have not worn oﬀ (Koop, 2003). We therefore divide the
1,000 draws from the posterior distribution into a ﬁrst set of N1 = 100 draws, a middle set
of 500 draws and a last set of N2 = 400 draws as suggested by Koop (2003). We drop the
middle set of draws and therefore make it likely that the ﬁrst and last set are independent
of each other. The convergence diagnostic is given by
CD =
  θ1 −   θ2
  σ1/
√




by a central limit theorem, where   θi and   σi/
√
Ni denote the posterior means of the pa-
rameters and their numerical standard errors based on the i-th set of draws, for i = 1,2.
We plot the p-values for the null hypothesis that the set of draws are the same in the right
panels of Figure 11. The p-values are typically larger than conventional signiﬁcance levels
for the VAR coeﬃcients and the covariances, indicating that a suﬃciently large number of
draws has been taken for these parameters. However, the null hypothesis is often rejected
for the volatilities.
To summarize, the coeﬃcients and covariances have in general better convergence
properties than the volatilities. Since the focus of our analysis is on impulse responses
which are determined by the contemporaneous relations among variables and the propaga-
tion mechanism rather than the size of stochastic shocks we conclude that the convergence
properties of the Markov chain are satisfactory.
D Performance of the estimation algorithm
This appendix investigates the performance of the estimation algorithm using results ob-
tained from a Monte Carlo exercise. It also motivates our prior choices and some of the
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eter matrices Q and S. The Monte Carlo exercise consists of creating a bivariate data set
yT based on model (2) with p = 2 lags. This model has been simulated for 1050 periods
with smoothly evolving “true” underlying states βT, αT and hT. The idea is that the
complete model (2)-(5) should be able to retrieve the underlying states based on the sim-
ulated data yT. Since the focus of this paper has been on impulse responses, we evaluate
the performance of the estimation algorithm in terms of its ability to reproduce the true
impulse responses based on the underlying states.29
We show three ﬁgures obtained from this exercise. Figure 12 is based on a TVP-VAR
with unrestricted Q and block diagonal S, as e.g. in Primiceri (2005). Figure 13 results
from restricting Q to be diagonal and leaving S block diagonal. Finally, Figure 14 is based
on a TVP-VAR which restricts both Q and S to be diagonal. In all ﬁgures, the upper
left charts show the underlying “truth” whereas the upper right charts are based on our
baseline choice of priors. The middle left and middle right charts are based on priors which
allow for more and less time variation, respectively, varying the scaling factors kQ, kS and
kW which calibrate prior beliefs on the variance of shocks hitting the state equations (3)-
(5). The lower left charts result from choosing values for kQ, kS and kW close to zero
and the lower right charts are the impulse responses implied by a time invariant VAR
estimated by OLS.30
Figure 12 shows that the baseline speciﬁcation of the TVP-VAR with unrestricted Q
and block diagonal S has some trouble in reproducing the true impulse responses, whereas
the speciﬁcation with a larger prior time variation seems to come somewhat closer. As
we reduce the prior scaling factors kQ, kS and kW the model implied impulse responses
quickly approach the OLS implied responses. Hence, although there is time variation in
the true impulse responses and despite a relatively large sample, the estimation algorithm
is not able to pick up this time variation. Figure 13 indicates that restricting the coeﬃcient
hyperparameter matrix Q to be diagonal helps the baseline speciﬁcation to come closer to
the truth and even with smaller scaling factors kQ, kS and kW the estimation algorithm still
picks up some time variation. Finally, Figure 14 shows that restricting also the covariance
hyperparameter matrix S to be diagonal makes the estimation algorithm more robust to
the speciﬁc choice of priors. The baseline speciﬁcation picks up the underlying truth fairly
well, but also the speciﬁcations with somewhat more and somewhat less time variation
do a good job in matching the truth. However, if prior scaling factors are set to zero the
model implied impulse responses again resemble the OLS implied impulse responses.
Overall, this Monte Carlo exercise indicates a satisfactory performance of the estima-
tion algorithm. Importantly, the exercise has shown that the performance of the algorithm
tends to improve if the amount of estimated parameters is reduced by imposing restrictions
on the hyperparameter matrices Q and S.
29The speciﬁcation of the TVP-VAR follows the main text, using 15,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler
and dropping the ﬁrst 5,000 iterations. Details including the states used to simulate the model and the
state estimates are available from the authors upon request.
30In each graph we plot the reduced-form impulse responses of the second variable due to an innovation
in the ﬁrst variable corresponding to every 5-th observation.
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July 2010Table 5: Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostics.a,b
Estim. Parameters Thinning Factor Burn-in Replic. Total Runs
Coeﬃcients 4068 1 2 150
Covariances 452 1 10 429
Volatilities 678 1 4 208
a Parameters for Raftery and Lewis (1992) diagnostics are quantile = 0.025; desired accuracy = 0.025;
required probability of attaining the required accuracy = 0.95.
b Results are based on 5,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler with zero burn-in replications and
thinning factor 1.





Gov. Spending over GDP







Private Consumption over GDP








Figure 1: Data used in the baseline VAR. Notes. Government spending is
deﬁned as ﬁnal general government consumption spending plus government
investment; government spending and private consumption are expressed as
nominal shares of GDP; the short-term nominal interest rate is measured
in annual terms; source of ﬁscal data: Paredes, Pedregal, and P´ erez (2009);
source of remaining data: ECB’s Area-Wide Model database.
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 Interest Rate 
Quarters
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a spending shock, baseline time invariant
BVAR. Notes. Median impulse responses are reported with 16% and 84%
probability bands; spending increase is normalized to have size 1% of real
GDP; the responses of output, consumption and spending are measured in %
of GDP and have the interpretation of multipliers, i.e. responses in % of real
GDP due to spending increase of size 1% of real GDP; they are computed
according to the following formula: multiplier at horizon k = responding
variable’s response at horizon k/(spending response at horizon 0 × average
ratio of spending to responding variable over sample); the response of the
interest rate is reported in percentage points.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a spending shock in, extended time invari-
ant BVAR. Notes. Median impulse responses are reported with 16% and
84% probability bands; spending increase is normalized to have size 1% of
real GDP; the responses of output, consumption, investment, net taxes and
spending are measured in % of GDP and have the interpretation of multi-
pliers, i.e. responses in % of real GDP due to spending increase of size 1%
of real GDP; they are computed according to the following formula: multi-
plier at horizon k = responding variable’s response at horizon k/(spending
response at horizon 0 × average ratio of spending to responding variable over
sample); the response of the real wage is measured in %; the responses of
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a spending shock in selected quarters, baseline
TVP-VAR. Notes. Median impulse responses are reported with 16% and
84% probability bands; spending increase is normalized to have size 1% of
real GDP; the responses of output and consumption are measured in % of
GDP and have the interpretation of multipliers, i.e. responses in % of real
GDP due to spending increase of size 1% of real GDP; they are computed
according to the following formula: multiplier at time t and horizon k =
responding variable’s response at time t and horizon k/(spending response
at time t and horizon 0 × ratio of spending to responding variable at time
t); the response of the interest rate is reported in percentage points.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a spending shock in each year of the sample,
baseline TVP-VAR. Notes. Median impulse responses are reported with 16%
and 84% probability bands; spending increase is normalized to have size 1% of
real GDP; the responses of output, consumption and spending are measured
in % of GDP and have the interpretation of multipliers, i.e. responses in % of
real GDP due to spending increase of size 1% of real GDP; they are computed
according to the following formula: multiplier at time t and horizon k =
responding variable’s response at time t and horizon k/(spending response
at time t and horizon 0 × ratio of spending to responding variable at time
t); the response of the interest rate is reported in percentage points.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a spending shock at selected horizons, baseline
TVP-VAR. Notes. Median impulse responses are reported with 16% and 84%
probability bands; spending increase is normalized to have size 1% of real
GDP; the responses of output, consumption and spending are measured in %
of GDP and have the interpretation of multipliers, i.e. responses in % of real
GDP due to spending increase of size 1% of real GDP; they are computed
according to the following formula: multiplier at time t and horizon k =
responding variable’s response at time t and horizon k/(spending response
at time t and horizon 0 × ratio of spending to responding variable at time
t); the response of the interest rate is reported in percentage points.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of private investment and net taxes to a spending
shock in each year of the sample, extended TVP-VAR. Notes. Median im-
pulse responses are reported with 16% and 84% probability bands; spending
increase is normalized to have size 1% of real GDP; the impulse responses
are measured in % of GDP and have the interpretation of multipliers, i.e.
responses in % of real GDP due to spending increase of size 1% of real
GDP; they are computed according to the following formula: multiplier at
time t and horizon k = responding variable’s response at time t and hori-
zon k/(spending response at time t and horizon 0 × ratio of spending to
responding variable at time t).
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of the real wage and the HICP based inﬂation
rate to a spending shock in each year of the sample, extended TVP-VAR.
Notes. Median impulse responses are reported with 16% and 84% probability
bands; spending increase is normalized to have size 1% of real GDP; the
response of the real wage is measured in %; the response of the inﬂation rate
is reported in percentage points, in annual terms.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a spending shock in each year of the sample,
baseline TVP-VAR with stationarity conditions imposed. Notes. Median
impulse responses are reported with 16% and 84% probability bands; spend-
ing increase is normalized to have size 1% of real GDP; the responses of
output, consumption and spending are measured in % of GDP and have the
interpretation of multipliers, i.e. responses in % of real GDP due to spending
increase of size 1% of real GDP; they are computed according to the following
formula: multiplier at time t and horizon k = responding variable’s response
at time t and horizon k/(spending response at time t and horizon 0 × ratio
of spending to responding variable at time t); the response of the interest
rate is reported in percentage points.
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Figure 10: Potential determinants of spending multipliers. Notes. Debt-to-
GDP ratio is in nominal annual terms; ratio of credit to households over
GDP is outstanding (end-of-period) loans to households divided by the sum
of nominal GDP of the last four consecutive quarters; output gap outgapt
is measured as quarterly percentage deviation from trend real GDP, trend
is based on HP-ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1600; ratio of imports over
GDP and shares of government investment and wage expenditures in total
spending are based on quarterly nominal data; source of ﬁscal data: Paredes,
Pedregal, and P´ erez (2009); source of remaining data: ECB’s Area-Wide
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Figure 11: Convergence diagnostics for state vectors. Notes. Horizontal
axes refer to vectors of time-varying parameters with one point representing
one parameter at a given time (e.g. volatilities hi,t); left panels: ineﬃciency
factors, i.e. inverse of Geweke’s (1992) relative numerical eﬃciency measure;
computed as IF = 1+2
 ∞
k=1 ρk, where ρk is the k-th order autocorrelation
of the Markov chain; right panels: P-values of Geweke’s (1992) convergence
diagnostic; computed as CD = (  θ1 −   θ2)/(  σ1/
√
N1 +   σ2/
√
N2) → N(0,1),
where N1 = 100, N2 = 400, middle 500 draws dropped.
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July 2010Figure 12: Impulse responses from Monte Carlo exercise, Q unrestricted
and S block diagonal. Notes. Impulse responses are estimated based on a
simulated bivariate data set with 1050 observations; every 5th reduced-form
response of the second variable to an innovation in the ﬁrst variable is plotted;
left axes: observations/time; right axes: horizon of impulse response.
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July 2010Figure 13: Impulse responses from Monte Carlo exercise, Q diagonal and S
block diagonal. Notes. Impulse responses are estimated based on a simulated
bivariate data set with 1050 observations; every 5th reduced-form response
of the second variable to an innovation in the ﬁrst variable is plotted; left
axes: observations/time; right axes: horizon of impulse response.
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July 2010Figure 14: Impulse responses from Monte Carlo exercise, Q and S diagonal.
Notes. Impulse responses are estimated based on a simulated bivariate data
set with 1050 observations; every 5th reduced-form response of the second
variable to an innovation in the ﬁrst variable is plotted; left axes: observa-
tions/time; right axes: horizon of impulse response.
62
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1219
July 2010Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo